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I. INTRODUCTION 
To have freedom of the press guaranteed in the Constitution is one thing; to enjoy 
it in actuality is quite another, as one Korean-born American scholar has put it.' The 
obvious truth of this disparity between constitutional ideals and practical application can 
hardly be refuted considering that the practice of press freedom in a country is affected 
by social, political and cultural factors, among others.2 
One authority has noted, however, that the disparity is not a great concern when 
there exists a politically functioning system with checks and balances between the exec-
utive, legislative and judicial branches of government.3 In connection with the impor-
tance attached to the checks-and-balances principle in the actual practice of press free-
dom, the role of an independent judiciary is crucial. As one journalism professor stated 
cogently: urAl nation's press is free, not necessarily because of constitutional guarantees, 
* Assistant Professor, Loras College. 
, Nam, Press Freedom in the Third World, in COMPARATIVE MASS MEDIA SYSTEMS 309 (L. Martin 
& A. Chaudhary eds. 1983). 
2 Fred Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm commented in 1956 on the press in 
connection with its sociopolitical milieu: [T]he press always takes on the form and coloration of the 
social and political structures within which it operates. Especially, it reflects the system of social 
control whereby the relations of individuals and institutions are adjusted. F. SIEBERT, T. PETERSON 
& W. SCHRAMM, FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS 1-2 (1956). 
3 Gastil, The Comparative Survey of Freedom, FREEDOM AT ISSUE, January-February, 1983, at 5. 
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but because an unintimidated judiciary protects the press against government encroach-
ment.'" 
Although it is debatable whether South Korea is a functioning democracy in terms 
of how far Koreans exercise their "political rights and civil liberties" through participa-
tory politics,5 the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, as amended in 1980, provides for 
the separation of powers among the three branches of government.6 To all appearances, 
the Constitution "upholds the principle of checks and balances in government by re-
stricting presidential powers, strengthening the functions of the legislature and ensuring 
the independence of the judiciary."7 It is noteworthy, however, that the turbulent con-
stitutional history of South Korean politics cautions one against taking the words and 
phrases of the Korean Constitution at face value.s 
In a 1971 Journalism Quarterly article on the libel laws of Korea and Japan, the 
authors observed: "The desire for the rule of law is heard in Korea ... but the judiciary 
there finds its role constrained under the influence of an overpowering executive branch 
of government."9 They also noted that Korea lacks a strong constitutional shield for 
protecting press freedom.1O This comment on a rather undemocratic aspect of the 
4 Wilcox, Black Ajiican States, in PRESS CONTROL AROUND THE WORLD 222 (J. Curry & J. Dassin 
eds. 1982). See also Kim, Freedom of Political Speech vs. National Security in Korea - A Historical Survey, 
5 INT'L LAW. 488, 489 (1971). 
5 As defined by Raymond Gastil, an authority on the comparative survey of freedom, political 
rights are "primarily the rights to participate directly or through freely elected representatives in 
the determination of the nature of law and its administration in society"; civil liberties, which "make 
possible the organization and mobilization of new alternative, or non-official opinions," include 
"freedom of the news media and of political, professional, worker, peasant, and other organizations." 
Gastil, supra note 3, at 3. 
6 See Republic of Korea Const., art. 38(4) ("Executive power shall be vested in the Executive 
Branch headed by the President"); art. 76 ("Legislative power shall be vested in the National 
Assembly"); art. 102(1)("Judicial power shall be vested in courts composed of judges"), amended in 
1980. For an English translation of the Republic of Korea Constitution, as amended in 1980, see 1 
LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA I-I-I-19 (4th ed. 1983) [hereinafter KOREAN LAWS 1983]. See also 
8 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 1-23 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1985) 
[hereinafter WORLD CONSTITUTIONS]. 
7 FACTS ABOUT KOREA 89 (16th rev. ed. 1981). In regard to the guarantee of judicial indepen-
dence, the present Constitution of Korea provides: "Judicial power shall be vested in courts com-
posed of judges" and that "[t]he judges shall judge independently according to their conscience 
and in conformity with the Constitution and laws." Republic of Korea Constitution, arts. 102(1), 
104, amended in 1980. For a discussion of the current Constitution of South Korea, see WORLD 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 6, at 1-6. 
8 One recent report on human rights in Korea noted: "[I]t would be a mistake to confine any 
discussion of the prospects of democracy in South Korea to a formalistic treatment of constitutional 
law since the political history of the country is filled with illustrations of the government's lack of 
respect for its own constitution .... " ASIA WATCH COMMITTEE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN KOREA: AN ASIA 
WATCH REPORT 54 (1986). 
9 Mowlana & Chin, Libel Laws of Modern japan and South Korea Are Compared, 48 JOURNALISM Q. 
326, 348 (Summer 1971). 
IO Id. at 330. See also The Amended Constitution of South Korea, 26 INT'L COMM'N JURISTS REV. 22 
(1981) (,,[T]he judiciary of South Korea has not enjoyed independence in the past"). Richard L. 
'Nalker, former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea in 1981-86, commenting on lack of institutional 
traditions for modern democracy in Korea, wrote in July 1987: "[T]he absence of a solid basis of 
law backed by an independent judiciary has hindered political development [in South Korea] 
.... [T]here is little historical background to support concepts of equality before the law, which is 
so essential for democratic procedures and institutions." Walker, If Seoul Is To Enjoy Democracy, New 
York Times, July 1, 1987, at A19, co!. 3. 
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Korean political system in the early 1970s is still valid in that the majority of Koreans 
express doubt about the positive role of their courts in protecting press freedom. II 
This article examines the way in which Korean courts interpret freedom of the press 
in the context of the traditionally authoritarian political structure of South Korea. In 
exploring the judicial interpretation of press freedom in Korea, the article focuses on 
two specific questions: (1) What kind of press laws have been in force in South Korea?; 
and (2) How have Korean courts applied these laws? 
Before considering the judicial approaches to press freedom in Korea, a brief exami-
nation of the structure and function of the Korean judiciary is necessary to understand 
the questions under study. 
II. ORGANIZATION OF THE COURTS IN KOREA I2 
The court system in Korea functions on three levels; one Supreme Court, three 
Courts of Appeal, eleven District Courts, and one Family Court. The Korean Constitution 
provides for one Supreme Court as the highest judicial tribunal. 13 The Supreme Court, 
as a court of final appeal, hears appeals from the judgments and rulings rendered by 
the Courts of Appeal. 14 It also hears appeals from decisions or rulings of a three-judge 
appellate panel of a District or Family Court in the second instance. 15 As in the American 
judiciary, the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its appellate 
jurisdiction "form the judicial precedents which are binding upon all other inferior 
courtS."16 The three-judge District or Family Court is ordinarily a court of the first 
instance, but the judgment of a single-judge District or Family Court is appealed to a 
three-judge District or Family Court panel as a court of the second instance. 17 The 
judgment of a three-judge District and Family Court panel in such second instances is 
appealed to the Supreme Court as the court of last resort. A 'jumping appeal," (biyak 
sango) carried directly to the Supreme Court against a judgment of a single-judge court 
or three-judge panel of a District or Family Court in the first instance, is recognized in 
Korea. 18 
II See Hahm & Yang, The Attitude of the Korean People Toward Law, in LEGAL SYSTEM OF KOREA 
145-201 (S. Chun ed. 1982); Lim, A Study on Legal Values in Korea: An Analysis of Attitude Toward 
Law, 2 Soc. SCI. J. 59-79 (1974). 
12 For preparation of this section, the author has relied upon Woong Shik Shin's article entitled 
Judicial Organization in Korea, in BUSINESS LAWS IN KOREA 64-107 (C. Kim ed. 1982). 
13 Republic of Korea Constitution, art. 102(2), amended in 1980. See also Court Organization 
Act, Law No. 51 (Sept. 26, 1949), art. 13, amended by Law No. 3362 (Jan. 29,1981). For an English 
translation of the Court Organization Act, as amended in 1981, see KOREAN LAWS 1983, supra note 
6, at 1-151-1-169. 
14 Court Organization Act, art. 17(1). 
ISId. art. 17(2). 
16 Shin, supra note 12, at 67. Article 7 (2) of the Court Organization Act stipulates: "A ruling 
in a judgment of an appellate court shall bind inferior courts in respect of subsequent proceedings 
in that case." Court Organization Act, art. 7(2) (emphasis added). Thus, Korean courts do not 
recognize the doctrine of stare decisis, as understood and practiced by the COllrtS in the United States. 
For a discussion of the stare decisis principle in the context of the Korean legal system, see INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF KOREA 17-18 (S. Song ed. 1983) [hereinafter INTRO-
DUCTION TO KOREAN LAW]. 
17 Court Organization Act, arts. 29(2), 32-5(2). 
18 The Code of Criminal Procedure provides the following grounds for a "jumping appeal": 
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The Courts of Appeal in Korea hear and adjudicate cases in panels or divisions 
designated as criminal, civil, or special, depending upon the nature of the case. 19 Each 
division is composed of a collegiate body of three judges, one of whom acts as the 
presiding judge.2o Distl'ict Court judges are sometimes designated and assigned to the 
Court of Appeals21 in order to dispose of pending appeals expeditiously.22 Although the 
Court of Appeals on occasion exercises original jurisdiction over administrative cases,23 
it is largely the court of intermediary appellate jurisdiction which reviews the judgment 
of the three-judge panel of a District or Family Court in the first instance. In addition, 
that court hears the appeals from rulings or orders of the three-judge court of a District 
or Family Court in the first instance.24 
The District Courts in Korea are the courts of general and original jurisdiction.25 
Judicial power of the District Court is exercised either by a single-judge court or by a 
collegiate body of a three-judge court.26 The three-judge District Court exercises original 
jurisdiction over prescribed "important" cases. However, it is also vested with the power 
to exercise appellate jurisdiction in that a ruling or an order of a single-judge District 
Court is to be appealed to the three-judge panel of the same District Court.27 Only a 
judgment, ruling, or order of a three-judge District Court in the first instance is appealed 
to the Court of Appeals. 28 The decision of the three-judge District Court is appealed 
directly to the Supreme Court, not to the Court of Appeals. 29 
The Family Court in Korea is the court of the first instance and is held at the same 
level as the District Court. It is concerned not only with the protection of an individual 
citizen's legal rights, but also with the maintenance of the welfare of juveniles and 
families. All decisions are reviewed by the Court of Appeals and subsequently by the 
Supreme Court.30 
The Korean Constitution provides that trials must be open to the public. 31 Public 
trials may be closed, however, by means of a court ruling when publicity is likely to affect 
When the court fails to apply facts which are recognized in the original judgment, or 
where there is an error in the application of laws and ordinances; When the penalty 
has been abolished or changed or general amnesty has been proclaimed subsequent 
to the rendition of the original judgment. 
Code of Criminal Procedure, Law No. 341 (Sept. 23, 1954), art. 372(1), (2), amended by Law No. 
3282 (Dec. 18, 1980). For an English translation of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as amended 
in 1980, see KOREAN LAWS 1983, supra note 6, at X-103-X-165. 
19 Court Organization Act, art. 24(1). 
2°Id. art. 24(3). 
21Id. art. 6. 
22 Shin, supra note 12, at 77. 
23 Code of Administrative Procedure, Law No. 213 (Aug. 24, 1951), amended by Law No. 1339 
(May 2, 1963). For the text of the Code of Administrative Procedure, as amended in 1963, see DAE 
BEOP JEON [UNABRIDGED CODE OF LAWS] 1446 (Hankuk Panrae Yeonguwon ed. 1982). 
24 Court Organization Act, art. 25. 
25Id. art. 29. 
26Id. art. 7. 
27 /d. art. 29(2)-1. 
28Id. art. 25. 
29Id. art. 17(2). 
30Id. art. 53(1). 
31 Republic of Korea Constitution, art. 26 (3), amended in 1980. See also Court Organization Act, 
art. 53. 
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national security, injure public welfare, or disturb social morals. 32 In court, whether open 
or closed, no one is allowed to videotape, photograph, or broadcast the proceedings 
without first obtaining the permission of the court.33 
III. PRESS LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
Between 1945, when Korea was liberated from Japan's colonial rule, and 1982, more 
than 360 laws and regulations have been adopted that restrict the Korean press in one 
way or another. 34 Some of the laws and regulations have directly dealt with freedom of 
the press. The Basic Press Act,35 enacted in 1980, and the Act Governing Import and 
Distribution of Foreign Periodicals36 are examples of direct restrictions on the press. 
Other laws and regulations affect the press indirectly.37 
A. Direct Press Laws 
1. The Basic Press Act 
Like many press laws throughout the world, the Basic Press Act of Korea is restrictive 
rather than protective of press freedom. For example, it makes public responsibility a 
legal requirement of the press. Article 3 provides: 
1. The press shall respect the dignity and value of human beings and the 
basic democratic order; 
2. The press shall perform its public duties by contributing to the formation 
of democratic public opinions concerning matters of public interest by means 
of news reports, commentary, and other methods; 
3. The press shall not infringe upon the personal honor or rights of an 
individual, or public morality or social ethics; 
4. The press shall not encourage or praise violence and other illegal actions 
which disrupt public order.38 
This "public responsibility" clause is III accordance with Article 20(2) of the Constitu-
tion.39 In this connection, the law provides that the news media must take "reasonable" 
caution with regard to the credibility, contents, and sources of all information before it 
is published.40 
32 Court Organization Act, art. 53(1). 
33Id. art. 54-2. 
34 HANKUK EONRON BEOPRYUNG CHONjIP 1945-1981 [A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF LAWS AND 
REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE KOREAN PRESS 1945-1981) 2-3 (J. Cheong ed. 1982) [hereinafter 
EONRON BEOPRYUNG). 
35 Law No. 3347 (Dec. 31, 1980) [hereinafter Basic Press Act). For an English translation of the 
Basic Press Act, see KOREAN LAWS 1983, supra note 6, at 111-122-111-135. 
36 Law No. 2535 (Feb. 17, 1973), amended by Law No. 3526 (Dec. 31, 1981). For the text of the 
Act Governing Import and Distribution of Foreign Periodicals, as amended in 1981, see EONRON 
BEOPRYUNG, supra note 34, at 68-70. 
37 For a discussion of the laws indirectly affecting the Korean press, see infra notes 58-103 and 
accompanying text. 
38 Basic Press Act, art. 3. 
39 The Korean Constitution explicitly prohibits speech or press actiVIties from violating the 
"honor or rights of other persons" or from uIldermining "public morals or social ethics." Republic 
of Korea Constitution, art. 20(2), amended in 1980. 
40 Basic Press Act, art. 9. 
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Among the rights of the press under the Korean Basic Press Act are those concerning 
access to public information and protection of news sources.41 However, the statutory 
rights of the press are not unlimited. Indeed, they are qualified in various ways. The 
Korean press, for example, cannot claim a right to request information of public concern 
when, in providing the requested information, the government or public authorities 
cannot carry out their normal functions in a "reasonable" way, and when the amount 
and extent of the requested information impedes the normal performance of duties to 
a "significant degree."42 Moreover, Korean journalists are exempt from the "protection 
of news sources" clause of the law when they release information which constitutes a 
criminal offense.43 The other exemptions to the press's right to protection of news 
sources are: 
When the published material or information has been obtained in the course 
of committing a criminal act to be punished by penal servitude or impris-
onment for more than one year; [and] when the writer, informer, or a keeper 
of the material at issue has obviously committed a crime as prescribed in 
Article 2 of the Social Safety Act, considering the contents of the published 
information.44 
In connection with its registration clause,45 the Basic Press Act stipulates that the 
Korean Ministry of Culture and Information (MOCI) has authority to cancel registration 
of publications or to suspend them for less than one year for several reasons, one of 
which is: "When the contents of the publications fail repeatedly and flagrantly to serve the 
purpose declared in the registration or to perform their public responsibility for refrain-
ing from encouraging or praising violence or other illegal acts disrupting public order."46 
The MOCI is also empowered by law to oversee permission and revocation of licenses 
over Korean branch offices of foreign news media.47 
41 [d. arts. 6, 8. 
42 [d. art. 6(1), (4). 
43 [d. art. 8(1). 
44 [d. art. 8(2). Article 2 of the Social Safety Act enumerates crimes concerning insurrection 
against the Korean sovereignty and provocation of foreign aggression against Korea; crimes con-
cerning military insurrection against the Korean sovereignty and assistance for the enemy of Korea; 
and crimes concerning anti-state organizations. Social Safety Act, art. 2, Law No. 2769 (July 16, 
1975), amended by Law No. 3318 (Dec. 31, 1980). For an English translation of the Social Safety 
Act, as amended in 1980, see KOREAN LAWS 1983, supra note 6, at X-271-X-277. 
45 [d. art. 20. 
46 [d. art. 24(1)-4 (emphasis added). On August 23, 1985, the Ministry of Culture and Infor-
mation (MOCI) canceled the registration of Silcheon Munhak for allegedly violating Article 24(1)-4 
of the Basic Press Act. This was the first time that the registration of a periodical had been canceled 
by the Korean government under the Basic Press Act since 1980, when the Act was enacted. The 
MOCI charged that the quarterly publication carried articles focusing on socio-political issues rather 
than on literature and art, the kind of topics which were specified by the magazine in its original 
registration. In January 1987, Silcheon Munhak challenged the constitutionality of the Basic Press 
Act by filing suit with the Seoul Court of Appeals, claiming that the law infringes on the "essential 
substance" of press freedom by allowing the government to "practically license" the media to 
operate. Munhakjeonguijeongbu Ka Nairinunkeon Budang [Government Not justified in Setting Forth the 
Definition of Literature], DONG-A ILBO, Feb. 2, 1987, at 3. For a discussion of the statutory power of 
the MOCI as recognized by the Basic Press Act to cancel the registration of the Korean media, see 
Paeng, Eonron Kibon Beop Un Kaejeong Daeiya Handa [The Basic Press Act Should be Revised], SHIN 
DONG-A, October, 1985, at 226-32. 
47 [d. art. 28. Among the grounds for the rescission by the MOCI of the foreign news bureaus 
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The Basic Press Act also provides for individual relief from those suffering from 
press violations by recognizing requests for correction of such press reports. 48 Notwith-
standing the fact that Korea already has two statutes - the Civil Code49 and the Criminal 
Code 50 - dealing with defamation by the press of individuals, it should be noted that 
the Korean government has sought yet another statutory mechanism for redressing 
issues involving the conflict between the interest of the press and that of individual 
citizens. In this regard, Korean law stipulates: 
One who has suffered damage from a factual assertion published by a peri-
odical or a broadcasting network ... may request in writing to the publisher, 
editor, chief of the broadcasting network or its program director for printing 
or broadcasting a correction of the reporting within 15 days of the publishing 
by a daily newspaper, news service or a broadcasting network and within one 
month of its publishing by other periodicals.51 
Accordingly, anyone who has been damaged by the press is legally entitled to recover 
damages as long as the press reports at issue are wrongful assertions of fact, not ex-
pressions of opinion or criticism. For the purpose of "arbitrating disputes about requests 
for correction by those who suffer from coverage of the news media, as well as delib-
erating matters concerning the violation of rights by the press," the press law authorizes 
the establishment of a press arbitration commission.52 
2. The Act Governing Foreign Periodicals 
The South Korean government regulates incoming foreign publications through 
the Act Governing Import and Distribution of Foreign Periodicals.53 The statute is aimed 
at "providing regulations concerning the importation and distribution of periodicals 
published abroad in order to strive for the sound development of culture and the 
protection of law and order, as well as the preservation of good morals and manners 
unique to the nation."54 However, the practical effect of the law obviously goes further 
in that it often serves as legal pressure to curb the domestic circulation of certain foreign 
publications. Under the Act Governing Foreign Periodicals, the MOCI can take sweeping 
measures against foreign periodicals which the Korean government finds may "subvert 
the constitutional system of the state or undermine the public security and customs" of 
in Korea are: (1) that their publications carry stories undermining the national prestige of Korea 
and challenge the basic principles of the Korean Constitution; (2) that they disturb the order of 
the domestic Korean press. Id. art. 28(2)-3, (2)-4. 
48Id. art. 49(1). 
49 Law No. 471 (Feb. 22, 1958), amended by Law No. 3051 (Dec. 31, 1977). For an English 
translation of the Civil Code, as amended in 1977, see 3 KOREAN LAWS 1983, supra note 6, at VIl-
I-VIl-126. For a discussion of the Civil Code, see infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. 
50 Law No. 239 (Sept. 18, 1953), amended by Law No. 2745 (Mar. 25, 1975). For an English 
translation of the Criminal Code, as amended in 1975, see 3 KOREAN LAWS 1983 supra note 6, at 
X-I-X-44. For a discussion of the Criminal Code, see infra notes 66-78 and accompanying text. 
51 Basic Press Act, art. 49(1) (emphasis in text added). 
52Id. art. 50(1). Under the Basic Press Act, those who allegedly suffer from damaging press 
reports cannot appeal directly to the court for correction without first going through the press 
arbitration commission. Id. art. 51. 
53 Law No. 2535 (Feb. 17, 1973), amended by Law No. 3526 (Dec. 31, 1981). 
54 [d. art. I. 
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Korea.55 The government can order them suspended from sale or their contents de-
leted,56 and retract the permit for distribution of the periodicalsY 
B. Indirect Press Laws 
1. Special Security Acts 
The uniqueness of South Korea as one-half of a divided Korea explains why national 
security has always been of paramount concern for Koreans in general, and for the 
Korean government in particular. Thus, the Korean government has resorted to diverse 
approaches toward maintenance of national security. 
a. The National Security Act 
Typical of the special laws currently in effect is the National Security Act, enacted 
In 1980.58 It provides, in part: 
Any person who has benefited anti-state organizations by way of praising, 
encouraging, or siding with or by other means, the activities of the anti-state 
organizations, their members or the persons who had been under instruction 
from such organizations, shall be punished by penal servitude for not more 
than seven years. 59 
b. Martial Law 
The Korean Constitution accords the President the power to "temporarily suspend 
the freedoms and rights of the citizens" when grave or extraordinary circumstances 
threatening the security of the state require him to take necessary "emergency mea-
sures".60 
Furthermore, Article 52 of the Constitution grants the President the power to 
proclaim martial law to "maintain the public safety and order by mobilization of the 
military forces in time of ... national emergency."61 Special measures may be taken with 
respect to press freedom,62 as well as other matters relevant to the enforcement of 
martial law.63 The special law authorizes the martial law commander appointed by the 
55Id. arts. 7,8. 
56Id. art. 7. 
57Id. art. 8. 
58 Law No. 3318 (Dec. 31, 1980), superseding Anti-Communist Act, Law No. 643 (july 3, 1961). 
For an English translation of the National Security Act, see KOREAN LAWS 1983, supra note 6, at X-
64-X-70. 
59Id. art. 7(1) (emphasis added). 
60 Republic of Korea Constitution, art. 51(1), (2), amended in 1980. 
61 !d. art. 52(1). 
62Id. art. 52(3). 
63 Martial Law, Law No. 3442 (Apr. 17, 1981). For an English translation of the Martial Law, 
see KOREAN LAWS 1983, supra note 6, at II-154-II-156. 
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President "to take special measures with regard to ... the press" when martial law is 
enforced.64 
2. Penal Laws 
It is not surprising that Korea has a number of statutory apparatuses to deal with 
potential conflicts between press freedom and the interests of individuals. This is a 
recognition on the part of the Korean government that "freedom of the press does not 
exist in isolation from the rest of society; press power must be reconciled with other 
interests of the society in which the press functions."6s As compared with the special 
security laws of Korea, various penal laws now in force governing the Korean press are 
mainly aimed at protecting the legal interests of citizens, e.g., the right to a good 
reputation, the right to privacy, and the right of free speech. 
a. The Criminal Code 
In 1975 the Korean government revised part of the Criminal Code66 to make it a 
crime to slander the State. The newly added clause of the statute, prohibiting the 
seditious defamation of the Korean government, stipulates: 
1. Any Korean national, who endangers or is assumed to endanger the 
security, interest and dignity of Korean governmental bodies established 
under the Constitution, by distorting the truth about them or disseminating 
false information concerning them or in any other way, shall be punished 
by penal servitude or imprisonment for not more than seven years; 
2. Any Korean national who commits such acts as prescribed in the preceding 
paragraph by use of foreigners or foreign organizations shall be punished 
in the same way as in the preceding paragraph.67 
Under the provision, it is illegal for Koreans to criticize the government, government 
officials, or the President while speaking to foreigners or representatives of foreign 
organizations, including foreign journalists. Furthermore, the law is applicable to Ko-
reans residing or visiting abroad in that their criticism of the Korean government will 
constitute a violation of the law. 
Under the criminal law of Korea, defamation of the national flag "for the purpose 
of insulting the Republic of Korea" may bring penal servitude or imprisonment for a 
maximum of one year, suspension of civil rights for not more than five years or a fine 
64 [d. art. 9(1). The Martial Law provides that the President shall declare martial law: 
[EJither to cope with the military needs or to maintain the public safety and order in 
time of war, state of siege or similar national emergency under which the functioning 
of the administrative and judicial branches of the government is deemed conspicuously 
difficult under the state of either armed conflict with the enemy or of the extreme 
disturbance of the social order. 
Id. art. 2(2). 
65 T. EMERSON, PRESS LAW IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES, xiii (P. Lahav ed. 1985). 
66 Law No. 239 (Sept. 18, 1953), amended by Law No. 2745 (Mar. 25, 1975). For an English 
translation of the Criminal Code, as amended in 1975, see KOREAN LAWS 1983, supra note 6, at X-
l-X-44. 
67 [d. art. 104-2. 
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of not more than 400,000 Won (U.S. $500.00).68 Similarly, it is statutorily forbidden to 
"profane" a foreign national flag. 6g The law also prohibits Koreans from defaming 
foreign heads of state or foreign envoys in Korea. For defamation of foreign leaders 
visiting Korea, a maximum of five years imprisonment or penal servitude of three years 
or less is imposed.70 
Obscenity is forbidden under the Criminal Code. Thus, it constitutes a crime to 
produce, possess, import, or export prurient materials.7I In addition, it is illegal to 
distribute, sell, or openly display obscene literature, pictures or similar goods.72 
As noted above, the Korean Constitution forbids the press to injure the reputation 
of an individual. Prior to the current Constitution, the Korean government had dealt 
with the defamation issue statutorily when it enacted the Criminal Code in 1953 and the 
Civil Code in 1958. 
The Criminal Code provides for crimes against reputation. Article 307 of the Code, 
while making a distinction between factual and false defamation, stipulates: 
1. A person who defames another by publicly alleging facts shall be punished 
by penal servitude or imprisonment for not more than two years or by a fine 
not exceeding 15,000 Hwan; 
2. A person who defames another by publicly alleging false facts shall be 
punished by penal servitude or imprisonment for not more than five years 
or suspension of civil rights for not more than ten years. 73 
The Criminal Code clearly distinguishes libel (written defamation) from slander (spoken 
defamation), as indicated by the separate provisions for each. With regard to libel, the 
Code states: 
1. A person who, with intent to defame another, commits the crime of Section 
(1) of Article 307, by means of newspaper, magazine, radio, or other publication, 
shall be punished by penal servitude or imprisonment for not more than 
three years or fined not more than 25,000 Hwan; 
2. A person who commits the crime of Section (2) of Article 307, by the 
method described in the preceding section, shall be punished by penal ser-
vitude for not more than seven years or suspension of civil rights for not 
more than ten years. 74 
In light of the more lasting and pervasive impact of libel as compared with slander, 
Korean law provides that written defamation carries a more severe penalty than spoken 
68 [d. art. 106. The amount of the fine under the Criminal Code has been changed by the 
Temporary Act on Fines, which stipulates: "When the provisions for fines in the Criminal Code 
are to be applied, such fines shall be fixed in amounts equivalent to 40 times those specified in the 
provisions; provided, however, that where the monetary unit Hwan appears in the provisions, it 
shall be regarded as Won." Law No. 216 (Sept. 8, 1951), amended by Law No. 2907 (Dec. 22, 1976), 
art. 4(1). For an English translation of the Temporary Act on Fines, as amended in 1976, see 
KOREAN LAWS 1983, supra note 6, at X-49-X-50. 
69 [d. art. 109. 
70 [d. arts. 107(2), 108(2). 
71 [d. art. 244. 
72 [d. art. 243. 
73 [d. art. 307(1), (2) (emphasis added). 
74 [d. art. 309(1), (2). 
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defamation. This applies when the libelous publication is factual, as well as when it is 
false. 75 
The Criminal Code recognizes a justification for defamation "[i]f the facts alleged 
under Section (1) of Article 307 are true and solely for the public interest."76 Thus, if an 
alleged defamer is to be immune from prosecution for his defamatory act(s), either 
spoken or written, he is statutorily required to prove that his stated facts are true and 
only in the public interest. This "true and solely for the public interest" requirement as 
a defense against defamation presupposes that it does not matter whether a defamatory 
statement was made with or without intent to defame on the part of the defamer. 
The Criminal Code permits a criminal action against a defamatory falsehood on the 
dead. Article 308 reads: "A person who defames a dead person by publicly alleging false 
facts shall be punished by penal servitude or imprisonment for not more than two years 
or fined not more than 25,000 Hwan."77 Thus, the truthful defamation of the dead is 
not subject to prosecution. With regard to prosecution for defamation of the dead, it 
can be executed "only upon complaint."78 
b. The Civil Code 
In Korea, the Civil Code79 also provides for protection of individuals from defa-
mation. The Civil Code deals with defamation in two ways. First, it provides: 
1. A person who has injured another person, his liberty or reputation 
shall make compensation for any other damages arising therefrom as well as 
damages in the property; 
2. The court may order the compensation under the preceding section paid 
by periodic payments, and may order reasonable security furnished in order 
to ensure the performance of such obligation.80 
Second, under the special rule for defamation cases, the Code authorizes the court, on 
the complaint of the injured party, to order the alleged defamer to take "suitable 
measures to restore the injured good name of the defamed, either in lieu of or together 
with compensation for damages."81 
3. Other Legislation Affecting the Press 
The Korean Constitution prohibits the press, as well as individuals, from invading 
the privacy of others.82 This constitutional provision is specifically codified in the Minor 
75 For a discriminating penalty for defamation depending on libel or slander, compare Article 
309 (see supra note 74 and accompanying text) with Article 307 (see supra note 73 and accompanying 
text). 
76 Criminal Code, art. 310 (emphasis added). 
77Id. art. 308 (emphasis added). 
78 I d. art. 312. 
79 Law No. 471 (Feb. 22, 1958), amended by Law No. 3051 (Dec. 31, 1977). For an English 
translation of the Civil Code, as amended in 1977, see KOREAN LAWS 1983, supra note 6, at VII-l-
VII-126. 
80 Id. art. 751(1), (2). 
81 Id. art. 764. 
82 Republic of Korea Constitution, art. 16, amended in 1980. 
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Offense Punishment Act,S3 which states: "Persons who have published in a newspaper, 
magazine, or other publication a false statement concerning the private or business 
affairs of another person ... shall be punished by detention or fine."84 Concerning 
coverage of judicial proceedings involving family matters, the Korean press is statutorily 
regulated and is prohibited from publishing the "names, ages, occupations, appearance 
and other facts or photographs which may identify those involved."85 
Similarly, the Juvenile ActS6 and the Children Welfare ActS7 also regulate the press. 
The former prevents juveniles under the protection of the law, or those under investi-
gation from being identified in the media.ss The latter bars production of books, peri-
odicals, or advertisements which are "assumed to be detrimental to the sense of morality 
of children."89 Under the Act Governing Protection of Minors,9o no one is allowed to 
distribute, sell, present, or show obscene documents, books or records.9! 
Korean election laws have provisions affecting press activities. The Presidential 
Election Law92 and the National Assembly Election Law93 make it illegal for the print 
and broadcast media to publish or broadcast false information on elections and their 
candidates or to distort facts about them.94 Moreover, the statutes prohibit the media 
from defaming candidates publicly by alleging facts, unless the allegations are true and 
only for the public interest. 95 The proscription against defamation of election candidates 
under the laws is similar to the provisions of the Criminal Code governing crime of 
defamation, except that the former stipulates a higher fine than the latter.96 As discussed 
above, the Act Governing Foreign Periodicals regulates foreign publications.97 Never-
theless, the law is not the only statutory tool used by the Korean government to deal 
83 Law No. 316 (Apr. 1, 1954), amended by Law No. 3329 (Dec. 31, 1980). For an English 
translation of the Minor Offense Punishment Act, as amended in 1980, see KOREAN LAWS 1983, 
supra note 6, at X-51-X-55. 
84 [d. art. 1 (9). 
85 Act Governing Court judgments on Family Affairs, Law No. 1375 (July 31, 1963), art. 8, 
amended by Law No. 1498 (Dec. 13, 1963). For the text of the Act Governing Court judgments on 
Family Affairs, as amended in 1963, see DAE BEOP JEON, supra note 23, at 1448-50. 
86 Law No. 489 (July 24, 1958), amended by Law No. 3047 (Dec. 31, 1977). For an English 
translation of the juvenile Act, as amended in 1977, see KOREAN LAWS 1983, supra note 6, at X-
174-X-183. 
87 Law No. 912 (Dec. 30, 1961), amended by Law No. 3438 (Apr. 13, 1981). For the text of the 
Children Welfare Act, as amended in 1981, see DAE BEOP JEON, supra note 23, at 3982-84. 
88 juvenile Act, art. 61. 
89 Children Welfare Act, art. 18(11). 
90 Law No. 834 (Dec. 13, 1961), amended by Law No. 3170 (Dec. 28, 1979). For the text of the 
Act Governing Protection of Minors, as amended in 1979, see DAE BEOP JEON, supra note 23, at 
856. 
91 [d. art. 2-2(2). 
92 Law No. 3331 (Dec. 31, 1980). For the text of the Presidential Election Law, see DAE BEOP 
JEON, supra note 23, at 70-81. 
93 Law No. 3359 (Jan. 29, 1982). For the text of the National Assembly Election Law, see DAE 
BEOP JEON, supra note 23, at 85-95. 
94 Presidential Election Law, arts. 45, 180(2); National Assembly Election Law, arts. 66, 68, 170. 
95 Presidential Election Law, art. 194(1), (2); National Assembly Election Law, art. 171 (1), (3). 
96 Compare Presidential Election Law, art. 194 (see supra note 95 and accompanying text) and 
National Assembly Election Law, art. 171 (see supra note 95 and accompanying text) with Criminal 
Code, art. 309 (see supra note 74 and accompanying text). 
97 For a discussion of the Act Governing Import and Distribution of Foreign Periodicals, see 
supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. 
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with foreign periodicals. The Customs Act also directly affects the press.98 Article 146 
states: "No books, publications, circulars, and pamphlets ... which will either disturb 
the constitutional order or .which will harm public security or customs and morals shall 
be imported .... "99 Any person who violates the provisions of the Customs Act regarding 
foreign publications is subject to "imprisonment for one year or more, or fine of not 
more than two million Won" (U.S. $2,500), in addition to having the materials in question 
confiscated. 100 
The Korean press is restricted from covering the proceedings of the National 
Assembly sessions. The news media is required to obtain prior permission from the 
speaker of the Assembly or chairman of its committees in order to "record, videotape, 
take pictures, broadcast" the plenary sessions of the Korean parliament or its committee 
meetings. lOl 
A provision of the Court Organization Act, which is identical to the National Assem-
bly Act, provides: "No person shall videotape, photograph, or broadcast events in a 
courtroom without permission from the presiding judge."102 This law is in accord with 
the constitutional provision regarding the justification for closing the trial to the public. 103 
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF PRESS LAWS 
A. Direct Press Laws 
In comparison to indirect penal laws and special statutes,104 direct press laws have 
been less frequently invoked by the Korean courts. Nevertheless, several cases involving 
the press laws indicate how the Korean courts have interpreted press freedom in the 
context of direct press legislation. The Kyunghyang Shinmun case of 1959 is one of the 
best known press cases because it best illustrates the resistance of a Korean newspaper 
in court to the suppressive South Korean government. 
Kyunghyang Shinmun, then a leading opposition paper, was ordered by the govern-
ment under President Syngman Rhee to close, on the ground that it violated U.S. Army 
Military Government Ordinance No. 88.105 The paper refused to follow the governmen-
98 Law No. 1976 (Nov. 29, 1967), amended by Law No. 3492 (Dec. 31, 1981). For an English 
translation of the Customs Act, as amended in 1981, see KOREAN LAWS 1983, supra note 6, at VI-
319-VI-391. 
99 /d. art. 146(1). 
100 [d. art. 179. 
!OI National Assembly Act, Law No. 3360 (Jan. 29, 1981), art. 147, amended by Law No. 33423 
(Apr. 8, 1981). For an English translation of the National Assembly Act, as amended in 1981, see 
KOREAN LAWS 1983, supra note 6, at 1-55-1-80. 
102 Law No. 51 (Sept. 26,1949), art. 54-2, amended by Law No. 3362 (Jan. 29,1981). For an 
English translation of the Court Organization Act, as amended in 1981, see KOREAN LAWS 1983, 
supra note 6, at 1-151-1-169. 
103 The Korean Constitution states: "[T]rials may be closed to the public by court decision when 
there is a danger that such trials may undermine the national security or disturb public safety and 
order, or be harmful to public morals." Republic of Korea Constitution, art. 110, amended in 1980. 
104 For a discussion of the indirect press laws, see supra notes 58-103 and accompanying text. 
105 Ordinance No. 88 of the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (1945-48) provided for 
the revocation or suspension of licenses of the print and broadcasting media for any of the following 
reasons: "The making of any false or misleading statement or omission in the application for a 
license; [f]ailure to report any change in the information furnished in the application .... " USAM-
GIK Ordinance No. 88, § IV. For an English translation of Ordinance No. 88, see MI KUNJEONG 
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tal order, challenging it as having been largely politically motivated. In Chang Woo Han 
v. Sung Cheon Cheon,106 the Seoul Court of Appeals granted Kyunghyang Shinmun an 
injunction temporarily suspending the order. The court held that the articles in question 
did not constitute a "clear and impending danger to the nation" and so the government's 
order to shut down the newspaper was an abuse of administrative power in violation of 
the law. 107 
The authoritarian Syngman Rhee government then issued a new order indefinitely 
suspending Kyunghyang Shinmun from publication shortly after withdrawing its first 
action in accordance with the court ruling invalidating the government order. The new 
order of the government against the embattled paper in essence overrode the decision 
of the Seoul Court of Appeals. 
Kyunghyang Shinmun again filed suit with the same Seoul Court of Appeals, refusing 
to follow the second government order suspending its publication. However, the Seoul 
Court of Appeals dismissed the paper's suit. It ruled that "the government action was 
legally appropriate and the U.S. Military Government Ordinance No. 88 was not uncon-
stitutional."108 The newspaper then appealed to the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court decided to refer the appeal to the Constitution Committee, 
which was empowered under the Constitution of 1948 to determine whether any laws 
to be applied to the present case would be in conflict with the Constitution. 109 The 
formation of the Constitution Committee was delayed, due in part to the constant 
wrangling among the three branches of government over the number of legal members 
to sit on the Committee. Consequently, the Committee failed to meet until after the 
April Students' Uprising of 1960, which toppled the Rhee government. The Supreme 
Court, which had been largely subordinate to the executive branch of the now defunct 
Rhee regime, became more bold in asserting its independence. On the appeal of Kyungh-
yang Shinmun, the Court overruled the decision of the lower court. 110 
BEOPRYUNG CHONGRAM [A COMPLETE COMPILATION OF LAWS AND ORDINANCES OF THE U.S. ARMY 
MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA] 189-91 (l975). 
106 Seoul Court of Appeals, June 26, 1959, 1959 Haingso 26, HANKUK SHINMUN YEONGAM 1968 
[KOREAN PRESS ANNUAL 1968] 519-28 (l968) [hereinafter YEONGAM]. 
107 [d. at 527. 
108 Chang Woo Han, Supreme Court, Feb. 5, 1960, 1959 Haingsang llO, YEONGAM, supra note 
106, at 528. 
109 The Republic of Korea Constitution of 1948 states with reference to the function and 
structure of the Constitution Committee: 
Whenever the decision of the case depends on the determination of the constitution-
ality of the law, the Supreme Court shall proceed in accordance with the decision of 
the Constitution Committee. The Vice President shall be the chairman of the Consti-
tution Committee and five justices of the Supreme Court and five members of the 
National Assembly shall serve as members of the Constitution Committee. A decision 
holding that a law is unconstitutional requires a two-third majority of the Committee. 
The organization and the rules of procedure of the Constitution Committee shall be 
determined by law. 
Republic of Korea Constitution, art. 81, ordained and promulgated in 1948. For an English translation 
of the Constitution of 1948, see 2 CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 549-59 (A. Peaslee ed., 2d ed. 1956). 
For a discussion of the 'Judicial review" function of the Constitution Committee in 1948-60, see D. 
Choi, Law and Social Change: The Korean Experience 209-16 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cali-
fornia, 1976). 
110 Kyunghyang Shinmun v. State, Supreme Court, Apr. 26, 1960, 1960 Haingsang 1l0, Y. 
Chang, EON RON KWA INKWON [THE PRESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS] 155 (1969). 
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The Korean press generally has fared better than in the case of Kyunghyang Shinmun 
in court decisions involving the application of direct press laws. This explains in part 
why the Korean media often turned to the court for an injunction against the enforce-
ment of administrative measures suspending their registrations. In Seok Hun Ham v. 
Minister of Culture and lnformation,lll for example, the plaintiff contended that the gov-
ernment violated his press freedom in violation of the Constitution. The government 
suspended the registration of Ham's monthly publication Sial Ui Sori on the ground that 
the periodical was not printed by the printer specified in the registration application 
form, but by others. The Seoul Court of Appeals ruled for Ham, holding that the 
cancellation of the registration of the plaintiff's periodical went beyond the authority of 
the government, and hence violated the press freedom of the plaintiff. ll2 This Court of 
Appeals ruling was affirmed by the Supreme Court, which held that the mere change 
in printers could not be a justifiable cause for cancellation of the publication. m 
The Supreme Court again rendered a judgment for the press when it ruled in Wan 
Hyuk Bu v. Minister of Culture and Information ll4 that the government could not exercise 
its discretionary power in cancelling a publication's registration 'Just because the pub-
lisher did not own his printing facilities" for the publication. ll5 This case arose from the 
MOCI's order to revoke the registration of Bu's monthly Sasangye on the ground that 
the plaintiff registered with the MOCI as printer, though he did not have printing 
equipment at the time of registration. 
B. The National Security Act and the Anti-Communist Act 
The Korean courts have applied the Anti-Communist Act, which is now superseded 
by the National Security Act, in numerous cases involving the press. ll6 In applying the 
restrictive laws, however, the courts have been notably aware of the possibility that the 
legislation would be abused in restricting the press. 
In Seok Chai Choi v. State,ll7 a 1956 case, for example, the Supreme Court affirmed 
the ruling of the Taegu Court of Appeals for the newspaper defendant who was charged 
with violating the Anti-Communist Act. The Court stated that Choi, who criticized the 
government in an editorial that appeared in Maeil Shinmun, wrote the editorial as a 
constructive suggestion for the authorities and not to serve the interests of North Korean 
communists. llB This case stemmed from Choi's criticism of the ruling authorities' mo-
bilization of young students for a series of government-sponsored rallies in protest of 
the communist nationals who were then supervising the cease fire of the Korean War. In 
the editorial, Choi pointed to the undesirable side effects of forced attendance on 
primary and secondary school children at the rallies. 
III Seoul Court of Appeals, May 4,1971,70 Ku 194, BEOPYUL SHINMUN [THE LAW TIMES], May 
17,1971, at 6. 
112 [d. 
113 Seok Hun Ham v. Minister of Culture and Information, Supreme Court, july 6, 1971,71 
Nu 62,19 DAEBEOPWEON PANGYOLjIP [SUPREME COURT CASE REpORTS] 2 (1971): 32-33 [hereinafter 
DAEBEOP PANGYOL]. 
114 Supreme Court, Apr. 25, 1972,71 Nu 183, BEOPYUL SHINMUN, May 8,1972, at 6. 
115 [d. 
116 For a discussion of the National Security Act, which has superseded the Anti-Communist 
Act, see supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. 
117 Supreme Court, May 8, 1956, 4289 Hyungsang 80, BEOPYUL SHINMUN, june 25, 1956, at 3. 
liB [d. 
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When an article advocating the proletariat movement in Korea is published as an 
expression of opinion, it does not violate the National Security Act. This was how the 
Seoul District Court interpreted the law with regard to an article published in a campus 
journal of Seoul National University in 1958. In Keun III Yoo v. State,119 the court held 
that the defendant wrote the article for a purely academic purpose, although the tone 
of the article appeared too radical. The court also noted that the defendant merely 
presented his ideas on socialist democracy. Thus, the court ruled that the defendant did 
not violate the National Security Act. 120 
In 1967, a Taegu district court used the "clear and present danger" test in ruling 
for the press. l2l In Sang Kwan Lee v. State,122 Judge Byung Chai Han ruled that the 
defendants, who published a news story on an espionage search operation allegedly in 
violation of the Anti-Communist Act, were justified in reporting the operation since 
their story did not pose the kind of present and immediate danger that would irreparably 
jeopardize the spy operation then under way. Judge Han, who emphatically noted that 
press freedom could not be curtailed merely on the ground that anti-communism hap-
pened to be a policy of the State, noted: 
Freedom of the press is most important for the survival of a political de-
mocracy. Only press freedom can ensure an ideal national consensus for us. 
It can also protect civil rights from being infringed by the government. It 
contributes to our playing a creative role for the overall national development 
through its criticism and factual reporting. Indeed, press freedom is a life-
and-death issue for our democracy.'23 
The Sang Kwan Lee case arose from a newspaper article reporting that the Yungdok 
County police began a search for North Korean espionage agents after being alerted to 
the discovery of spy equipment. Taequ Maeil Shinmun published the story, notwithstand-
ing a request from the police for a news blackout on the espionage operation. The 
government argued that the publication assisted North Korea by helping the communist 
agents to flee. In rejecting the government's arguments, Judge Han observed that first, 
despite the "news blackout" request, the newspaper received no "formal written request" 
from those in a responsible governmental position. Second, the information published 
in the newspaper had been common knowledge in the area for one week prior to the 
119 Seoul Criminal District Court, Apr. 3, 1958,4291 Hyungkong 74, BEOPYUL SHINMUN, July 
28, 1958, at 3. 
120 [d. 
121 In Schenck v. United States, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., writing for the Supreme 
Court of the United States, set forth the "clear and present danger" test in determining when the 
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech and the press can be restricted by the government. 
Justice Holmes defined the test: 
The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done .... 
The most stringent protection of speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting 
fire in a theatre causing a panic .... The question in every case is whether the words used 
are used in circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that 
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question 
of proximity and degree. 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (emphasis added). 
122 Taegu Criminal District Court, Oct. 18,1967,65 Ko 8762, BEOPYUL SHINMUN, Nov. 6,1967, 
at 6. 
123 [d. (emphasis in original). 
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publication of the article. Third, there was no evidence indicating the intention of the 
defendants to assist North Korea through the publication of the article. The ruling of 
the single-judge district court of Taegu was appealed by the government to the three-
judge appellate panel of the same district court. 124 In rejecting the appeal, the appellate 
panel of the Taegu District Court affirmed the decision of Judge Han. 125 
When a reporter of Dong-A !lbo, a leading Korean daily newspaper, wrote an article 
alleging that the government had not paid compensation money to an informant for 
one and a half years after he provided them with information concerning an espionage 
suspect, it was held that he did not violate the Anti-Communist Act. The Supreme Court 
in Ik Jin Jeong v. State l26 held that the reporter was not aware that his article could affect 
the counter-espionage operation or benefit the anti-state organization as proscribed by 
the law. Furthermore, the Court held that the news article contributed to the clarification 
of possible mishandling of the compensation fund by the government. 
In 1970, one year after IkJinJeong, the Seoul District Court inJe Yul Kim v. State,127 
declared that "once classified military information is discussed in public, it can be no 
longer categorized as secret. Thus, the publication of information no longer classified is 
not subject to punishment under the Anti-Communist Act and the Military Information 
Law."128 The Je Yul Kim case involved Dongyang News Agency, which reported on the 
three-year combat preparation plan debated at an open meeting of the National Defense 
Committee of the Korean National Assembly. The court held that the request by the 
government for a news blackout was no more than a type of mutual cooperation between 
the government and the press. Therefore, the court ruled that "even though the press 
did not comply with the request of the government, it could not be subject to penal 
punishment." 129 
These favorable decisions of the Korean courts with reference to press freedom 
suffered a setback, however, when the Supreme Court ruled in 1972 that information, 
even though published in newspapers or broadcast through radio and television, is 
protected by the National Security Act as a confidential national secret when it is known 
to North Korea and found useful to it. 130 
In another 1972 case, however, the Seoul District Court refused to invoke the Anti-
Communist Act in ruling on an article published in Donq-A !lbo. l3l The newspaper 
reported that some Koreans living near a military base cut up military tanks and sold 
them as scrap. The court reasoned that the reporter did not harm the overall confidence 
of the people in the Korean Army while benefiting the enemy.132 
124 For a discussion of the jurisdiction of the district courts in Korea, see supra notes 25-29 and 
accompanying text. 
125 See Sang Kwan Lee v. State, Taegu District Court, Nov. 7, 1969,68 No. 451, KIJA HYUPHOE 
Bo [KOREAN JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION NEWSLETTER], Nov. 21, 1969, at 2. 
126 Supreme Court, Apr. 29, 1969,68 Da 1631, BEOPYUL SHINMUN, May 26, 1969, at 4. 
127 Seoul District Court, June 15, 1970,68 Ko 21972, BEOPYUL SHiNMUN, Aug. 17, 1970, at 6; 
BEOPYUL SHiNMUN, Aug. 24, 1970, at 6. 
1281d. BEOPYUL SHiNMUN, Aug. 24, 1970, at 6. 
129ld. 
130 See, e.g., CheongJo Lim v. State, Supreme Court, Sept. 12, 1972,72 Do 1514, PANRAI WOLBO 
76 [MONTHLY REPORT OF COURT CASEs)(Nov. 1972}. 
131 See Bong Jin Chang v. State, Seoul Criminal District Court, Sept. 27, 1972, 72 Kohap 315, 
KIJA HYUPHOE Bo, Sept. 29, 1972, at 6; KIJA HYUPHOE Bo, Oct. 6, 1972, at 6. 
132 KIJA HYUPHOE Bo, Oct. 6, 1972, at 6. 
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Because it is often difficult to evaluate the contents of a publication, whether aca-
demic or artistic, a number of cases arose from publications dealing with sensitive 
subjects. Among those was a 1974 Supreme Court case, Cheong Bin Lim v. State. 133 In 
that case, the State asserted that the defendant, who contributed an article to Dari 
magazine, praised and benefited the communists outside the country by way of advo-
cating the so-called May Revolution of the ultra-leftist French students. Rejecting the 
argument of the State, Justice Young Seop Lee wrote for the Court: 
The article examines the past Korean student movements as compared with 
those of foreign countries .... It principally concluded that the Korean 
student movement should be changed to a cultural one to establish a national 
welfare society. Thus, it is a far cry from praising, encouraging, or siding 
with the activities of foreign communists or of North Korean communists. 134 
However, YongJoo Hwang, former president of Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation 
in Seoul, was found by the Seoul Criminal District Court to be benefiting anti-state 
organizations when his article, Our Firm Determination for a Unified Government in Korea, 
was published in Saidae magazine. In Yong Joo Hwang v. State,135 the court ruled that the 
ideas presented in his article were identical to those advocated by North Korea. 136 The 
district court held that Hwang depicted North Korea as another political entity on the 
Korean peninsula, in negation of the basic constitutional principle proclaimed by the 
Korean government that South Korea is the one and only legitimate government of the 
divided country. The court also noted that the article in question damaged the normally 
amicable relationship between South Korea and the United States. In addition, the court 
ruled that the implication of Hwang's article was that which the North Korean com-
munists had been hoping for - the creation of a favorable environment for a military 
revolution in South Korea.137 
The Anti-Communist Act also punished the act of copying books containing com-
munist propaganda. 138 The Supreme Court in Uh Soo Han v. State,139 for example, ruled 
that the defendant probably assisted the communists by duplicating a Chinese book on 
acupuncture. The Court noted that the book, though it primarily dealt with acupuncture 
as a medical procedure, contained a number of paragraphs in praise of Mao Tse-tung, 
then the chairman of the Communist Party in China. Although cognizant of the possi-
bility that those with access to copies of the acupuncture book would have been affected 
by the favorable discussion of the Chinese leader, the defendant went ahead copying 
133 Supreme Court, May 28,1974,74 Do 3423, PANRAI WOLBO 80 (Nov. 1974). 
134Id. 
135 Seoul Criminal District Court, Apr. 30, 1965,64 Ko 1811, BEOPYUL SHINMUN, May 17, 1965, 
at 6. 
136 In the article, Hwang maintained: (1) that North and South Korea should be admitted to 
the United Nations simultaneously; (2) that the United States stations its troops in South Korea 
only for its own interests; (3) that it is doubtful whether South Korea benefits from the U.S. military 
base in Okinawa, Japan; (4) that North and South Korea should sign a nonaggression pact and 
reduce their military forces on an equal basis; (5) that North and South Korea should schedule a 
conference aimed at reducing tensions and relaxing hostile relations between them. Id. 
137 BEOPYUL SHINMUN, May 17, 1965, at 6. 
138 Law No. 643 (July 3, 1961), superseded by National Security Act, Law No. 3318 (Dec. 31, 
1980). For an English translation of the Anti-Communist Act, see LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
776-780 (3rd ed. 1975). 
139 Supreme Court, Oct. 31, 1978, 78b Do 2254, 26 DAEBEOP PANGYOL 3 (1978): 82-85. 
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and selling the book. The Court declared that the act of the defendant apparently 
contributed to the communist cause in violation of Korean law. I40 
The Anti-Communist Act also prohibited South Koreans from listening to North 
Korean broadcasts and reading leaflets disseminated by the communists. In adjudicating 
such cases, the Korean courts have considered the circumstances involved. I41 
Under the Anti-Communist Act, for "keep[ing) in custody ... documents, drawings 
and any other similar means of expression in support of the activities of an anti-state 
organization,"142 the Seoul Criminal District Court sentenced a defendant who acquired 
allegedly seditious literature and passed it among several people, without notifying the 
authorities, to six months in prison. 143 The court ruled that the defendant's dissemination 
of leaflets and books on a South Korean soldier who defected to North Korea advanced 
the subversive activities of the enemy against South Korea. 
For the first time since it took power in 1980, the Chun Doo Hwan government 
tried to invoke the National Security Act in the famous Mahl case in June 1987. The 
Mahl case, which attracted attention in both Korea and abroad, arose from the publication 
in September 1986 of the press guidelines issued by the Korean government in the 
underground magazine called Mahl- Korean for "words."144 The bimonthly magazine, 
published by the Council for Democratic Press Movement (CDPM), an association of 
banned journalists, devoted an entire 63-page special issue to a chronological listing of 
the texts of hundreds of daily instructions issued by the Korean Ministry of Culture and 
Information to the Korean press between October 19, 1985, and August 8, 1986. 145 In 
December 1986, three months after the politically embarrassing information was pub-
lished in Mahl, the Korean police arrested two CD PM officials allegedly involved in the 
publication, as well as a journalist said to have leaked the guidelines to the CDPM, for 
violating the National Security Act. I46 They were charged with disseminating the kind 
of "groundless rumours" proscribed by the law. However, the guidelines, as published 
in Mahl, had little to do with national security or foreign relations, but they had a great 
deal to do with politically sensitive topics. For example, the directives instructed the 
editors not to print "damaging" news stories, such as the United States government's 
criticism of the human rights record of South Korea. In addition, they were told, among 
other things, to minimize coverage of the dissident activities of the opposition leaders, 
and to depict the anti-government demonstrations in a negative way.I47 
On June 4, 1987, in his verdict in the Seoul District Criminal Court, Judge Park 
Tae Bum sentenced the two journalists to suspended prison terms and set aside a penalty 
14°Id. at 83-84. See also Eul Kyung Pyo v. State, Supreme Court, Dec. l3, 1978, 78 Do 2243, 
26 DAEBEOP PANGYOL 3 (1978): l3l-40. 
141 See Deuk Woo Nam v. State, Supreme Court, Oct. 22, 1968, 68 Do lll8, slip op.; Kyu Shin 
Park v. State, Supreme Court, Jan. 28, 1975, 74 Do 3488, 23 DAEBEOP PANGYOL 1 (1975): 3-6. 
142 Law No. 643 (July 3, 1961), art. 4(2), superseded by National Security Act, Law No. 3318 
(Dec. 3l, 1980). 
143 See Chong Kuk Hwang v. State, Seoul Criminal District Court, Feb. 6, 1969, 68 Ko 1080, 
BEOPYUL SHINMUN, Feb. 24, 1969, at 6. 
144 For a detailed account of the Mahl case, see Lim, "Mahl": Ji Sakeon Kongpan Shimal [The 
Beginning and the End of the Trial of the Mahl Case], SHIN DONG-A 480-93 (July 1987). 
145 For an English translation of part of the Korean government's press guidelines, see Korea: 
"Guiding" the Press, lNDEX ON CENSORSHIP 30-36 (May 1987). 
146 McBeth, "Guidelines" for the Press, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Mar. 19, 1987, at 34. 
147 Korea: "Guiding" the Press, supra note l45, at 30-36. See also South Korea: Voices for Democracy, 
4 WORLD POLICY J. l6l, l66 (Winter 1986-87). 
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for the third journalist, as a gesture of 'Judicial generosity. "148 In finding the defendants 
guilty of violating the National Security Act, Judge Park observed that their publication 
of the press guidelines was used by North Korea "for propaganda, and thus their actions 
had harmed the natio~al interest."149 The judge noted, however, that the journalists 
were motivated by a "deep interest" in the South Korean press l50 and sought to normalize 
the Korean press system. 151 
C. Martial Law and Emergency Decrees 
As discussed above,152 the Korean press has been subject to restrictions imposed by 
martial law and emergency decrees. Indeed, the scope of the restrictions created by 
these extraordinary measures was far more extensive than other statutory restrictions. 
As a result, more often than not, the martial law and emergency decrees had been 
enforced by the government in a sweeping manner without being challenged in court. 
Presidential Emergency Measure No.9, proclaimed in May 1975,153 for example, 
prohibited any person from fabricating and disseminating groundless rumors or from 
diffusing distorted facts. What is noteworthy about the emergency decree in the context 
of judicial interpretation is that the Supreme Court limited its applicability when it 
declared that a person who told only one other person allegedly distorted facts should 
not be found guilty of "a disseminating or diffusing act."154 On the other hand, the 
definition of the martial law phrase "groundless rumors" was expanded by the Supreme 
Court in Seong Churl Park v. State. 155 In this 1981 decision, the Court interpreted "ground-
less rumors" as not only false statements but also those which exaggerated or distorted 
facts. Furthermore, the court stated "[ilt is an act of disseminating groundless rumors 
when you mention them or distribute the books containing them, though they have been 
already known to some people."156 
D. The Criminal and Civil Codes 
The revision of the Criminal Code in 1975 made it a crime to slander the State. 157 
A 1983 Supreme Court case, which was the Court's first ruling based upon the "Crime 
of Slander Against the State" provision of the code, showed how far the law could go in 
circumscribing freedom of expression in South Korea. The Supreme Court in Churl Kee 
Kim v. State l58 overruled the lower court's decision, holding that the distribution by the 
defendant of anti-government leaflets to Korean and foreign correspondents in Korea 
148 McBeth, Judicial Generosity, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, June 18, 1987 at 24. 
149 Haberman, Press Censorship Case is Resolved in South Korea, N.Y. Times, June 5, 1987, at AS. 
150 [d. 
151 McBeth, supra note 148, at 24. 
152 For a discussion of the Martial Law and Emergency Decrees, see supra notes 60-64 and 
accompanying text. 
153 Presidential Emergency Measure No.9 (May 13, 1975). For an English translation of Emer-
gency Measure No.9, see DOCUMENTS ON THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN KOREA 264-67 (1975). 
154 See Man Song Cho v. State, Supreme Court, May 11, 1976, 76 Do 876, PANRAI WOLBO 92-
93 (Oct. 1976). 
155 Supreme Court, Apr. 14, 1981,81 Do 543, BEOPYUL SHINMUN, May 18, 1981, at 6. 
156/d. 
157 For a discussion of the revision to the Criminal Code in 1975, see supra notes 66-67 and 
accompanying text. 
158 Supreme Court, June 14, 1983,83 Do 515, BEOPYUL SHINMUN, June 27, 1983, at 6. 
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was against the Criminal Code. The lower court had ruled that Kim's act of passing out 
literature to foreign reporters did not constitute a crime under the law because the 
allegedly seditious material was not yet used against Korea and its constitutional bodies. 159 
The Supreme Court disagreed. In an 11-2 opinion, the Court held that the spirit of the 
law was to prevent any act defaming Korea. In this regard, the Court observed, the 
distribution of the leaflets at issue constituted the kind of activities proscribed by the 
law. The Court noted that the printed material was intended to defame the State. 
Strongly dissenting from the majority opinion, however, Justice II Kyu Lee took 
issue with the manner in which the majority of the Court had interpreted the law: 
A Korean national, who has distributed allegedly prohibited materials to 
foreigners, cannot be punished under the law until the foreigners have used 
them against Korea within Korea, by damaging the security, interest, and 
prestige of Korea. Furthermore, even if the foreigners used the materials 
not in Korea but abroad, ... the Korean [cannot be punished] for violating 
the law. This is because the allegedly criminal act of the Korean was not 
committed within Korea. 16o 
Justice Hee Chang Lee, criticizing the "overextended interpretation" of the law by the 
majority of the Court, also dissented from the majority opinion. He observed that the 
defendant did not use foreign correspondents to defame the Korean Constitution and 
government, since the foreigners did not use the distributed material against Korea. 
Thus, according to Justice Lee, it would not constitute a crime under the law merely to 
pass the material to foreigners unless it is actually used against Korean governmental 
entities. 161 As the Churl Kee Kim case shows, it is now a criminal offense for Koreans to 
either criticize South Korea to a foreign correspondent or for Korean residents abroad 
to question the legitimacy of Korea as a sovereign state or Korea's constitutionally 
established bodies. 
In a 1971 study on the libel laws of Japan and Korea, it was noted that libel litigation 
in Korea is generally a rare phenomenon. 162 This observation is still true. Indeed, over 
the past thirty years, only thirty libel and slander cases have been adjudicated. 163 Of 
those cases, one-third have, in varying degrees, involved the press. 164 In libel litigation, 
the Criminal Code has been invoked much more frequently than the Civil Code, at least 
until recently.165 
159 Churl Kee Kim v. State, Seoul Criminal District Court, Feb. II, 1983, 82 Do 6161. 
160 Churl Kee Kim, BEOPYUL SHINMUN, June 27, 1983, at 6. 
161 [d. 
162 Mowlana & Chin, supra note 9, at 330. 
163 For a list of cases, see K. Youm, Freedom of the Press in South Korea, 1945-1983: A Sociopolitical 
and Legal Perspective 296-99 (Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Illinois University, 1985). 
164 [d. 
165 Won-Soon Paeng, professor of communication law at Hanyang University in Seoul, South 
Korea, explains: 
First, the opinion has been prevalent in Korean society that a man who has injured 
another's reputation should be subjected to penal punishment as part of retributive 
justice. Second, it has not been our tradition in Korea that the infringment on the 
reputation of another person should be recompensed for in terms of monetary dam-
ages. 
W. PAENG, MASS COMMUNICATION BEOPjE IRON [A THEORY OF MASS COMMUNICATION LAWS] 139 
( 1984). 
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The libel case of Jong Yeol Lee v. State 166 is noteworthy because the Supreme Court 
interpreted "specificity" as a libel element in a somewhat tortuous way when used in the 
context of group libel. This case arose from a magazine article which depicted the people 
of Cholla Province in a disparaging way. The author of the article, in giving "flesh and 
blood" to his article, referred to the plaintiff as being typical of the Cholla people. On 
the question of whether the article constituted group libel, the Court held that it could 
not because it lacked specificity concerning the identification of the target. Nevertheless, 
the Court stated that it was libelous of the person specifically mentioned in the publi-
cation. 
In Jeong Hoon Ko v. State,167 a 1962 libel case, the Supreme Court held that the 
evidentiary truth of a defamatory statement made by a defendant must be presented in 
order for the defendant to be exempt from liability. By requiring that the "truth" defense 
be supported by concrete evidence germane to the libel, the Jeong Hoon Ko case made 
the burden of proof enormously heavy. Incidentally, in connection with the proceedings 
of the case, newspapers which ran the allegedly defamatory statement were not prose-
cuted. This demonstrates that Korean courts put the primary liability of defamation on 
its originator, rather than on its disseminator. 
The Supreme Court in Woon Song v. State 168 ruled on a case involving a news story 
which reported that police allegedly violated the civil rights of a suspected prostitute 
taken into custody. The article further stated that the policemen would be subject to 
some complaint from family members of the woman. Although the writer of the story 
had allegedly been aware of the fact that the woman was a prostitute, he wrote erro-
neously that she was highly reputed for her "womanly virtues." The policemen involved 
argued that the story was libelous because it damaged their professional reputation as 
law enforcement officers. The Seoul Court of Appeals agreed and sentenced the defen-
dant to imprisonment for six months. The plaintiffs were not satisfied with the sentencing 
of the Seoul court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs contended that the 
penalty handed down by the lower court was too lenient, considering the fact that it 
concerned a libelous act by a reporter. The Supreme Court, holding for the appellants, 
ruled that the status of the defendant as a reporter, coupled with the effect of his 
allegedly inaccurate publication, should be duly weighed in determining the duration of 
imprisonment. Consequently, the reporter was sentenced to a ten-month jail term. 169 
In a 1969 civil libel case, the Seoul Civil District Court ruled that the defendant 
must publish a letter of apology for defamation, in addition to paying damages arising 
from his libelous publication. l7O In passing upon the liability of the defendant for pub-
lishing a defamatory advertisement in a newspaper, the court held that the damage 
payment was insufficient for the loss suffered by the defamed. The court stated that the 
best possible way for the defendant to recompense the plaintiff was by the publication 
166 Supreme Court, Nov. 15, 1960,4293 Hyungsang 244, BEOPYUL SHINMUN, Dec. 12, 1960, at 
3-4. 
167 Supreme Court, May 17, 1962,4294 Hyungsang 12, BEOPYUL SHINMUN, May 28,1962, at 
3. 
168 Supreme Court, Nov. 16, 1961,4294 Hyungsang 451, BEOPYUL SHINMUN, Dec. 11, 1961, at 
1. 
169Id. 
170 See Hee Young Lee v. I1shin Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Co., Seoul Civil District Court, 
June 20, 1969,68 Ka 11886, BEOPYUL SHINMUN, Sept. 14, 1970, at 6; BEOPYUL SHINMUN, Sept. 21, 
1970, at 6. 
1987] PRESS FREEDOM 155 
of an apology in an advertisement in the same newspaper which first carried the libelous 
statement. I7l This was the first time that the Civil Code provision for libel was utilized 
in a defamation case involving the press. 
In recent years, Korean courts have tended to order libelous statements corrected 
or retracted rather than imposing penal servitude on libel defendants. 172 This is largely 
related to the application of the Basic Press Act. 173 A 1984 civil libel case, Eui Hyang Lee 
v. Sang Kee Kim,174 is the seminal decision in the libel law of Korea because it indicates a 
new judicial approach, viewing press freedom in the context of its role in a political 
democracy. This case stemmed from a story published in Donq-A !lbo. The plaintiff, who 
was operating an institution for mentally retarded children, allegedly made illegal per-
sonal profits from improper operation of the institution. It was further contended in 
the story that some inmates of the institution staged a sit-in to protest its mismanagement. 
The Seoul Civil District Court, i.e., the court of first instance in the case, found part of 
the publication true, but not completely accurate. The defendant newspaper was re-
quired to prove the truth of its allegations under a "substantial evidence" standard. 
When the newspaper failed to present the necessary evidence, the court ruled that it 
must publish a correction of the article as requested by the plaintiff l75 
On appeal, the appellate panel of the Seoul District Court ruled that the correction 
should be revised so that it could better focus on the inaccurate portion of the story. I76 
The court rejected the defense argument that the application for a correction of a 
published news story should be adjudicated on the basis of the statutory requirement of 
torts. 177 
Lee did not let his legal battle against Donq-A !lbo end with the "correction of the 
report" ruling. He asserted that the article in question defamed him. For alleged injury 
to his reputation, he asked the defendant newspap(lr for one billion Won (U.S. $125 
million) in damages. In addition, he asked for the publication of a formal letter of 
apology.178 Ruling for the defendant, the Seoul Civil District Court held: 
You will not be liable for a news story allegedly defamatory of a person when 
you have published it for the public interest and can prove the truthfulness 
of the story. Moreover, even when you fail to meet the burden of proof, you are not 
subject to statutory penalty as long as you can show that you had reasonable ground 
for believing in the truth of the published story .... When you have plausible 
material or sources to convince you that the story is true, you can satisfy the 
171 BEOPYUL SHINMUN, Sept. 21, 1970, at 6. 
172 See, e.g., Hyung Shin Lim v. Ku HoJeong, Seoul District Court, Sept. 3,1982,82 Ka 18633, 
EONRON JUNGJE [PRESS ARBITRATION QUARTERLY) 137-39 (Autumn 1982); Chai Ran Ahn v. Hyung 
Jin Ryu, Seoul District Court, May 25, 1984,84 Ka 1598, EONRON JUNGJE 171-73 (Winter 1984); 
Eui Hyang Lee v. Sang Kee Kim, Seoul District Court, Apr. II, 1984,82 Kahap 4734, EONRON 
JUNGJE 174-77 (Summer 1984). 
173 For a discussion of the Basic Press Act, see supra notes 38-52 and accompanying text. 
174 Seoul Civil District Court, Apr. II, 1984,82 Kahap 4734, EONRON JUNGJE 174-77 (Summer 
1984). 
175 Eui Hyang Lee v. Sang Kee Kim, Seoul Civil District Court, Nov. 4, 1982,82 Kahap 27454, 
EONRON JUNGJE 169-71 (Winter 1982). 
176 Seoul Civil District Court, Oct. 20, 1980,82 Na 4188, EONRON JUNGJE 189-91 (Winter 1983). 
I77 The Korean Civil Code provides: "Any person who causes damages to another person 
intentionally or negligently by an unlawful act shall make compensation for damages arising there-
from." Civil Code, art. 750. 
178 Eui Hyang Lee, 82 Kahap 4734, Apr. 11, 1984, EONRON JUNGJE 174-77 (Summer 1984). 
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requirement that to avoid liability for a wrong under the civil law, you should 
have reasonable grounds for your wrongful act. 179 
The court further noted that utmost care should be exercised not to restrict freedom of 
the press when the press is required to assume liability for an allegedly defamatory 
publication. 180 
Concerning the statutory crime of obscenity, Korean courts have taken various 
approaches in applying the Criminal Code. In Kee Hong Han v. State,181 for example, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the viewing of pornographic films at a private home would 
not be an act of "open display" and so it was not against the law governing obscenity. 
With reference to the meaning of the phrase, "openly displays obscene ... pictures," as 
provided for in the Criminal Code,182 the Court held, "[tlo display obscene pictures 
openly means to expose those pictures to the situation where many and unspecified 
persons can watch them. Accordingly, it is not the case for a few and specified people 
to watch them."183 
In dealing with the commercial use of nude pictures, the Supreme Court in 1970 
focused on the fact that those involved in the manufacture or sale of such pictures must 
have "put them to commercial use" because they knew the obscene aspect of the pic-
tures. 184 The Court further held that the standards of obscenity should be objective, not 
merely the subjective value judgments of those who deal in nude pictures. ISS 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
"For a visitor from another planet to try to understand our society from reading 
our constitutions and laws," one American scholar has observed, "would be almost as 
misleading as his attempting to do the same from monitoring our network television 
fare."186 The sheer number of press-related laws, which have been in force in South 
Korea during the past four decades, therefore, may not present a totally accurate picture 
of press freedom in terms of actual practice in this Asian country. Indeed, numerous 
restrictive Korean press laws and regulations illustrate how press freedom, though 
constitutionally guaranteed, carries little practical meaning in authoritarian South Korea. 
In comparison with direct press laws, numerous indirect statutes are even more 
restrictive of press freedom in Korea. That is, security laws, martial laws, emergency 
decrees, and penal laws are more frequently employed against the press. The National 
Security Act, which has superseded the much criticized Anti-Communist Act, and the 
anti-State defamation provision of the Criminal Code stand out as the most articulated 
threat to the Korean press freedom. 
179ld. at 176-77 (emphasis added). 
IRO ld. at 177. 
lSI Supreme Court, Aug. 21, 1973,73 Do 409,21 DAEBEOP PANGYOL 2 (1973): 47-49. 
182 Law No. 239 (Sept. 18, 1953), art. 243, amended by Law No. 2745 (Mar. 25, 1976). 
183 See In Wi Jeong v. State, Supreme Court, Oct. 23, 1973,73 Do 2178,21 DAEBEOP PANGYOL 
2 (1973): 25. 
IR4 See Sang Churl Shin v. State, Supreme Court, Oct. 30, 1970, 70 Do 1879, PANRAI WOLBO 
79 (Jan. 1971). 
Issld. 
ISfi Stevens, Freedom of Expression: New Dimensions, in MASS MEDIA AND THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
27 (R. Farrar & J. Stevens eds. 1971). 
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The Korean judiciary, which has traditionally failed to play an important role in 
balancing the highly centralized power structure in Korean society, has been far from 
forceful as a protector of civil liberties and political rights as understood in most open 
democratic societies. 187 In this regard, the judicial interpretation of press freedom in 
Korea demonstrates that the courts have often tried to respond to political pressure, 
rather than acting as a "vital or experimental body" in the protection of the sociopolitical 
rights of Koreans. 188 Despite a minority of cases in which the Korean courts have clearly 
understood the affirmative function of the press, the Korean judiciary tends to be overly 
timid in protecting the press from even overt repression by the government. This is 
particularly true in respect to the rulings of the Supreme Court, as exemplified by the 
Kyunghyang Shinmun case. In contrast, some district courts have looked at press freedom 
from a somewhat more "libertarian" perspective. 189 
In drawing the statutory parameters of press freedom, the Korean courts have failed 
to establish precedentially consistent reasoning in their rulings. This has confounded 
the problem of defining the extent to which the Korean press can expect to be statutorily 
protected by the courts in exercising its freedom. Nevertheless, three concluding obser-
vations can be made on how the Korean courts have applied press laws in Korea. 
First, in interpreting libel laws, Korean courts have seldom considered the intentions 
of the defamers in making the libelous statements or publications. In connection with 
the statutory justification of defamation, the courts have focused on the question of 
whether the defamatory publications or statements were proven true by convincing 
evidence and whether they were made in the interest of the public. The courts have 
punished the originators of the allegedly defamatory remarks, not the disseminators of 
the defamation. This is contrary to the widely understood principle in adjudicating 
defamation litigation that "talebearers are as bad as talemakers."19o Insofar as statutory 
and case law of media defamation is concerned, Korea does not distinguish between 
situations in which the defamed person is a public officiaUfigure and those in which he 
is a private figure, an important distinction in U.S. libellaw. 191 
187 INTRODUCTION TO KOREAN LAW, supra note 16, at 67-68, reprinting Steinberg, Law, Develop-
ment, and Korean Society, 13 KOREANA Q. 43-80 (Fall 1971). 
188Id. at 68. For illuminating discussions of the current status of judicial independence in 
Korea, see Hwang, Sabeopbu Dokrip Eun Minjujueui Eui Kicho [The Independent Judiciary is the Foun-
dation of Democracy], SHIN DONG-A 304-09 (Feb. 1987); Sabeopbu Wa Dokripseong [The Judiciary and 
Its Independence], SHIN DONG-A 234-67 (Oct. 1985). 
189 Under the "libertarian" press theory, the press functions to inform, entertain, and sell. The 
main purpose of the press, however, is to uncover and present the truth. The press often serves as 
the Fourth Estate, supplementing the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. 
Press freedom in a libertarian society is a right of citizens, not a special privilege to be accorded by 
the government to a limited segment of society. Anyone who can pay for it may operate a com-
munication medium, and say whatever he likes, except perhaps for personal defamation, obscenity, 
invasion of privacy, wartime sedition, and the like. For a detailed discussion of the libertarian press 
theory, see Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, supra note 2, at 39-71. 
190 W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
799, n.23 (5th ed. 1984), citing Cavalier v. Original Club Forest, 59 So. 2d 489 (La. App. 1952). 
191 In the "federal" constitutionalization of libel law, the U.S. Supreme Court has set forth a 
distinction between public persons and private persons in the status of libel plaintiffs: A public 
person - "public figure" or "public official" - must prove constitutionally defined "actual malice," 
that is, that the defendant published false defamatory material with knowledge or reckless disregard 
of its falsity, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). A "private" person, on the other 
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Second, in applying security-related laws to the Korean press, more often than not, 
the Korean courts have been notably circumspect, obviously aware of the prejudicial 
implications of their decisions upon press freedom. In such cases, the courts have focused 
on the concept of "publicly or openly" when dealing with acts banned by the laws and 
decrees. 
Third, in invoking direct press laws, the Korean courts have generally ruled for the 
press. Particularly in minor violations of press laws, the courts have dismissed as unjus-
tifiable the government's cancellation of the registration of the allegedly libelous publi-
cations. Consequently, direct press laws have not been as worrisome to the Korean press 
as such indirect laws, as inter alia, penal statutes and martial laws. 
On the other hand, the recent "breathtaking" political developments in Korea since 
July, 1987 may bring about an overall positive change in the sorry status of press freedom 
in this Asian country.192 The Korean government has taken a giant step toward a more 
open democracy in adopting the June 29,1987, proposalofRoh Tae Woo, then chairman 
of the ruling Democratic Justice Party, for sweeping sociopolitical reforms. 193 The sudden 
turnabout in the vicious circle of political violence in Korea has already brought the 
Korean press "blinking into a world of relative freedom."194 Undoubtedly, the "epochal 
democratic development" for "an advanced form of democracy" in Korea, which was 
enunciated by President Chun Doo Hwan on July 1, 1987,195 cannot be realized without 
a fundamental revision of a number of repressive laws and regulations governing the 
press. 196 In connection with the need for revising the statutory framework of press 
hand, need only show that the defendant was "at fault" in publishing the defamatory falsehood, 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
192 See McBeth, Roh's Bold Stroke, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, July 9, 1987, at 8-11. South 
Kurea's "Miracle" Week, NEWSWEEK, July 13, 1987, at 26. 
193 Among Roh's proposed reforms are the speedy amendment of the current Constitution 
allowing for direct presidential election and a peaceful transfer of power in February 1988, revision 
of the Presidential Election Law to guarantee freedom of candidacy and fair competition, maximum 
promotion and protection of basic rights including press freedom, and guarantees to allow the free 
and democratic growth of political parties. Text of Roh's Statement on Proposed Reforms, Korea Herald, 
June 30, 1987, at 3. [hereinafter Roh's Statement]. 
194 Kristof, New [sic] From South Korea: Printing All of the News, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1987, at 
All. See also Burgess, S. Kurean Media's Brave News World, Wash. Post, July 6, 1987, at A18; Chira, 
Kurea's Press Awaits the Promised Freedom, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1987, at A6; Hiatt, Clamur for Liberties 
Grows in Korea, Wash. Post, July 18, 1987, at A19; Sneider, South Korea Press Spreads Its Wings, 
Christian Science Monitor, July 1, 1987, at 9. 
195 Excerpts From Speech by South Korea President, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1987, at 6 [hereinafter 
President's Speech]. 
196 The Korean government is currently in the process of revising the Basic Press Act in the 
context of Roh Tae Woo's June 29, 1987, statement on proposed political reforms. In his statement, 
Roh, then chairman of the ruling Democratic Justice Party, declared: 
[F]or the promotion of the freedom of the press, relevant systems and practices must 
be drastically changed. 
However good its intention may be, the Basic Press Law, which has been the target 
of criticism by most journalists, needs drastic revision or repeal as early as possible. 
This could be replaced by another. 
The autonomy of the press must be guaranteed through the permission (of Seoul's 
newspaper and broadcasting companies) to assign their reporters to local areas and 
by revoking the system of issuing press cards. 
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freedom in the "new era of democratic development and mature politics,"197 it is equally 
important that the separation of powers theory should be put into more general practice 
in Korean politics. Given that press freedom in Korea has been more often threatened 
by the heavy-handed extra-legal governmental agencies than anything else,198 the func-
tioning system of checks and balances in Korean politics can serve as one of the institu-
tionalized mechanisms to which the press may turn for protection when it is in danger 
of being suppressed by the authorities. 
In summary, the recent sociopolitical changes in Korea may be an auspicious sign 
that the Korean press, which has been for so long subject to various types of suppression, 
may gain more freedom. These positive developments should lead, for example, to 
concomitant changes in the judicial status of press freedom in Korea by forcing the 
revision of a number of restrictive direct and indirect press statutes, in accordance with 
the dominant theme of the proposed political advances in Korea. As Roh noted, "People 
are the masters of the country, and the people's will must come before everything else."199 
The government cannot and must not attempt to control the press. The press 
must not be restricted unless it threatens national security. Let's be reminded that an 
independent judiciary and the people only judge the press. 
Roh's Statement, supra note 193, at 3. On July 30,1987, a "senior" official at the Korean Ministry of 
Culture and Information reportedly said the Basic Press Law will be replaced by two separate 
statutes governing newspapers, news agencies and broadcasting services, adding, "[t]he drafting of 
bills is likely to be completed next week after consultations with the ruling Democratic Justice Party 
and they will be tabled at a National Assembly session expected in August." Establishment of Mass 
Media by Biz Groups to Be Discouraged, Korea Times, July 31, 1987, at 2. See also 2 New Laws to Replace 
Basic Press Law This Month: Minister Lee, Korea Herald, July 15, 1987, at I. 
197 President's Speech, supra note 195, at 6. 
198 For up-to-date accounts of various instances of extra-legal repression of Korean press, see 
COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS UPDATE, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, and INTERNATIONAL PRESS 
INSTITUTE REPORT, among others. 
199 Roh's Statement, supra note 193, at 3. 
